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JURISDICTION1 
This is an appeal from the grant of the trial court (Honorable Robert K. Hilder of 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah) of two 
summary judgment motions on December 7, 2005 (R. 908-13) ("2005 Order") (attached 
hereto as Addendum A), and November 29, 2006 (R. 1440-49) ("2006 Order") (attached 
hereto as Addendum B), thereby dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant E&M Sales West Inc. dba 
Heatsource's ("Heatsource") Complaint and Second Amended Complaint respectively 
against Defendant/Appellee Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC ("BJC"), and 
Defendant/Appellee Diversified Metal Products, Inc. ("DMP"). Diversified Control 
Systems ("DCS"), a cross-claimant against Heatsource, is not a party to this appeal. This 
Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, [the appellate court] gives no 
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the issues presented under a 
correctness standard." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 
UT 72, ^ [8, 167 P.3d 1080. Importantly, "[fjactual disputes are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no statutes, 
constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative. 
1
 BJC specially appears through counsel in this matter and without waiving its rights, 
pursuant to the trial court's ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, to challenge the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over BJC by Utah courts after discovery or at trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding, and Disposition Below 
This case relates to a fixed-price contract between BJC and DMP pursuant to 
which BJC paid DMP $716,798 for producing a heater probe system to be used in BJC's 
environmental cleanup project in Tennessee for the United States government. (R. 333). 
BJC issued a request for proposal for this fixed price contract, DMP submitted a bid for 
the work, BJC accepted DMP's bid, and BJC entered into a contract with DMP for the 
work. (Id.) After BJC and DMP entered into the contract, BJC provided DMP with a 
Specification (the "Spec") for the work. (R. 333-34). 
Once DMP had the Spec, DMP subcontracted with Diversified Control Systems 
("DCS") to produce a five-zone heater to be inserted into the heater probe system. (R. 
334). DCS then sought out and subcontracted with Heatsource in September 2000, to 
produce the five-zone heater that would be inserted into the heater probe system. (R. 
335). Heatsource produced a five zone heater, and along with DCS and DMP, presented 
the contracted for work to BJC in August 2001. (R. 337-38). Then, through DMP, 
Heatsource, DCS and DMP submitted a request for equitable adjustment to BJC seeking 
increased payments from BJC. (Id.) BJC paid DMP $716,798 pursuant to the Contract 
for the production of the entire probe system and related work. (Id.) BJC rejected the 
request for equitable adjustment from DMP, DCS, and Heatsource because it was a fixed 
price contract and the BJC Spec never changed. (Id.) 
Heatsource filed its Complaint against BJC on March 1, 2002 alleging four causes 
of action for quantum meruit, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
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unjust enrichment, and fraud. (R. 1-5). In response to Heatsource's Complaint, BJC 
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue on April 
23, 2002. (R. 33-59). Although the trial court denied BJC's motion to dismiss, it did so 
without prejudice, and stated that "[i]f so advised, Defendant may raise the issue of 
jurisdiction at or prior to the trial of this action through a Rule 56 Motion or evidentiary 
hearing." (R. 96-100). Inasmuch as BJC has no contract with Heatsource, BJC filed a 
third-party complaint against DMP on October 16, 2003, claiming breach of contract, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, indemnity, and requesting 
declaratory relief. (R. 162-73). DMP and DCS later cross-claimed against Heatsource 
for breach of contract and quantum meruit. (R. 238-44, 246-49). 
BJC filed its first motion for summary judgment on August 12, 2005. (R. 326-
537). Heatsource failed to comply with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
failed to controvert any of the evidence submitted by BJC, and submitted an affidavit that 
the trial court struck based on evidentiary shortcomings. Therefore, the trial court found 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact and accepted as undisputed all of the 
material facts set forth in BJC's memorandum. (R. 908-913, 1442-43). 
After viewing these undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Heatsource, the 
trial court dismissed Heatsource's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims, finding 
that they are identical, equitable in nature, and can only be brought in the absence of an 
express contract covering the subject matter of the underlying work performed. (R. 909-
10). Since the undisputed facts reveal that there was an express contract between BJC 
and DMP, and subcontracts between DMP and DCS, and DCS and Heatsource, the trial 
3 
court found that the work performed by Heatsource "related to the production of the five-
zone heaters [which] was subject to, and within the scope of, the express contracts and 
subcontracts involved" and therefore Heatsource's claims were barred. (R. 910). 
Regarding Heatsource's breach of covenant claim, the trial court found that the 
pleadings and the undisputed facts reveal that Heatsource did not plead "and does not 
have, a direct contract, either express or implied with BJC." (R. 911). Since there is no 
direct contract between Heatsource and BJC, the trial court found that there is no implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and dismissed the claim. (Id.) On the fraud 
claim, the trial court found that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Heatsource could 
not "establish the requisite elements of a claim for fraud." (R. 910). Specifically, the 
trial court dismissed the claim because Heatsource could not establish a false statement 
by BJC regarding presently existing facts, that a BJC representative knowingly made a 
false statement, and because Heatsource could not show detrimental reliance. (Id.) 
The trial court, therefore, granted BJC's first motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing with prejudice Heatsource's claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. (R. 909-911). 
The trial court granted limited leave to Heatsource to file a Second Amended Complaint 
to assert a direct contract implied in fact claim against BJC and an implied covenant 
claim if the implied covenant claim asserted a breach beyond alleged nonpayment by 
BJC. (R. 911-12). The trial court did not grant leave to allege other claims. (Id.) 
2
 The trial court later explained that "the Order allowing amendment was an abundance of 
caution, because BJC had argued persuasively that plaintiff may not assert equitable 
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Heatsource filed its Second Amended Complaint on December 9, 2005, alleging 
breach of an implied contract in fact and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. (R. 914-20). BJC filed a second motion for summary judgment on October 27, 
2006. (R. 1059-1288). After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted 
BJC's motion for summary judgment. With respect to the implied in fact contract claim, 
the trial court held that "both contract implied in law and contract implied in fact theories 
are barred if enforceable contracts exist covering the same subject matter." (R. 1440-
1449). The trial court also found that there is no evidence or course of conduct to 
establish that there was a contract implied in fact between Heatsource and BJC. (Id.) 
Without the existence of any express or implied in fact contract between Heatsource and 
BJC, there was no implied covenant and Heatsource's breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing failed as well. (Id.) Heatsource now appeals portions of both 
of the trial court's rulings on BJC's two motions for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
In a clear and concise manner, Heatsource should have presented the facts, and 
disputes of fact, if any, that the trial court considered in making its decisions on both 
motions for summary judgment in order to give this Court the information it needs to 
understand the underlying issues. Although not required to formally marshal the 
evidence on an appeal from a motion for summary judgment, this case requires a similar 
claims under the general rubric of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, if the subject 
matter of the claim is covered by a contract or set of contracts." (R. 1442). 
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exercise because most of the facts considered by the trial court on BJC's motions for 
summary judgment were not controverted by Heatsource or were deemed admitted.3 
Importantly, Heatsource is not appealing the trial court's ruling that Heatsource 
failed to controvert the facts, even though such ruling was made in both the 2005 and 
2006 Orders, and Heatsource has not argued in its Brief that this ruling was incorrect. 
Because Heatsource has not appealed the trial court's decision to deem BJC's facts 
admitted, Heatsource has not only waived its right to appeal that aspect of the trial court's 
orders, but has accepted those facts as true and undisputed. Similarly, the trial court ruled 
that the Affidavit of Andrew Nelson should be stricken based on evidentiary 
shortcomings. Heatsource has not appealed this discretionary ruling of the trial court, has 
failed to argue in its Brief that the ruling was incorrect, and therefore, has waived any 
challenge to that ruling. 
This is significant because on summary judgment this Court resolves all 
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. In this instance, most of the facts have been deemed undisputed by the trial court 
and/or accepted by Heatsource. Based on those facts alone, this Court can and should 
affirm the trial court's decisions on both motions for summary judgment because no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Despite its failure to appeal these rulings of the trial 
court, Heatsource has simply forged ahead, ignored the rulings, and presented evidence to 
3
 The facts contained in paragraphs 1-21 and 33 herein were deemed admitted by the trial 
court in its 2005 Order. (R. 908-13), Addendum A. The facts contained in paragraphs 22 
through 31 were found to be undisputed by the trial court. (R. 1445-48), Addendum B. 
Heatsource has admitted the facts contained in paragraph 32. (R. 1308). 
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this Court that was disregarded and stricken below, was not properly presented as 
evidence below, or that was not presented at all to the trial court. This is improper and all 
such evidence, and arguments based on this evidence, should be stricken.4 
Since Heatsource has failed to appeal these evidentiary rulings, and the rulings 
were correct and within the trial court's discretion, the following facts are undisputed: 
1. B JC is performing the role of Management and Integration Contractor for 
Environmental Management for the United States Department of Energy. In performing 
this work, BJC was to perform environmental cleanup of the Molten Salt Reactor 
Experiment located near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (R. 333, 1065-64). 
2. As part of the cleanup process, BJC issued a Request for Proposal to design 
and build the MSRE Salt Melting and Processing Probe System (the "System") The 
scope of the contract to be awarded included design, fabrication, testing and certification, 
including operation and maintenance manuals for the System. (R. 333, 1066). 
3. DMP made a successful bid proposal to produce the System and was, 
therefore, issued a purchase order contract. (R. 334, 1066). 
4. On May 29, 2000, DMP and BJC signed a purchase order contract pursuant 
to which DMP was obligated to produce the System, which included producing a heater 
probe. (R. 334, 1066). 
5. The contract between BJC and DMP was a fixed price purchase order and 
the procurement package/specification was performance based. The cost of building the 
System and all of the equipment and components as required by the Spec, was within the 
4
 BJC has filed a Motion to Strike on these issues concurrently herewith. 
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scope of the contract and subsequent subcontracts between DMP and DCS, and then 
eventually DCS and Heatsource. (R. 334, 1066-67). 
6. DMP subcontracted with DCS, and under that subcontract, DCS agreed to 
produce the heaters that were part of the System. DCS then sought out Heatsource which 
represented that it had expertise in preparing heater probes. In September 2000, DCS 
subcontracted with Heatsource, through a purchase order, for Heatsource to produce a 
five-zone heater as part of the System. (R. 335, 1067). 
7. Under its subcontract with DCS, Heatsource was required to produce the 
heaters for the System and the testing of the heaters was included in the subcontract 
between DCS and Heatsource. In fact, Andrew Nelson, the owner of Heatsource, 
testified as follows: 
Q. Did you understand at that time that the work you were 
performing was part of a larger obligation of DCS to DMP 
and DMP to Bechtel Jacobs? 
A. Yes. 
(R.335, 1067-68). 
8. The probe that Heatsource was to produce was described in section 2.5.2.4 
of the original Spec, issued by BJC to DMP. Heatsource admits that it received and knew 
all of the Specs, contained in section 2.5.2.4 except one related to a testing temperature. 
(R. 335-36, 1068, 1446). 
9. BJC's Spec, for the heat probe system never changed during the entire 
process. In fact, Nelson testified that he had reviewed the Spec, a few times in 2001 and 
explained: 
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Q. Did you ever see that [Specification itself change? The 
words [on] those pages, those provisions, did those change at 
any time between the glimpses that you had? 
A. No, they didn't change. 
(R.336, 1068,1400). 
10. Neither DMP, nor any of its subcontractors, including Heatsource, ever 
asked for a change or modification to the Spec, despite the fact that Heatsource was told 
of these channels, the parties knew that requests for modifications could be made, and 
that there were multiple other modifications requested and approved throughout the 
process. (R. 336, 1068). 
11. The work performed by Heatsource, including the new "solution" or "U-
bent" technology, was part of Heatsource's obligation under its subcontract with DCS. 
(R. 1446). Heatsource admitted that the description of its work in its subcontract with 
DCS equally describes the "U-bent" heater and the non-U-bent heater. (R. 336, 1068). 
12. Prior to the request for equitable adjustment, Heatsource never said that it 
would require extra compensation, that it would bill on a time and materials basis for the 
U-bent technology, or that the work would cost more. (R. 336-37, 1068-69, 1446). 
13. The first time that Heatsource asked for additional money for its work was 
when it submitted the request for equitable adjustment to BJC through DMP as the party 
who had the direct contract with BJC. (R. 337, 1069). 
14. BJC contracted with DMP to get a probe, and a probe is what was produced 
by DMP, DCS, and Heatsource. BJC accepted the System on August 9, 2001, and paid 
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DMP $716,798 pursuant to the Contract for the production of the entire probe System 
and related work. (R. 337, 1069). 
15. Heatsource did not have a direct contract with either DMP or BJC. (R. 337, 
1069). 
16. Heatsource did not make a direct demand on BJC for payment, and instead, 
Heatsource invoiced DMP for its work "performed during this period . . . for the Second 
Generation probe heaters for the Oak Ridge MSRE project." (R. 337, 1069). 
17. When Heatsource and DCS, through DMP, sought an equitable adjustment 
to the Contract price, BJC properly and in good faith considered the request. BJC 
rejected the request for equitable adjustment, however, because there was no change in 
the Spec, to justify additional amounts. (R. 338, 1069). 
18. While DMP may not have liked the decision, DMP knew that it was within 
BJC's rights to deny the request for equitable adjustment, and the grounds for denial were 
sound. Herb Pollard of DMP testified that he believed BJC did not act improperly. (R. 
338, 1070). 
19. Heatsource bases its fraud, contract implied in fact, and covenant claims on 
three statements it claims were made by BJC representatives Rick Dearholt and Rob 
Szozda at a June 27, 2001 meeting. The three purported statements were to the effect that 
the project had "become a research and development project," that if Heatsource does this 
work then BJC would "take care o f Heatsource, and that if Heatsource "do[es] this 
work, the money truck will be backing up to the building." These statements were 
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purportedly made at the meeting at DMP on June 27, 2001, and not at any time before or 
after that date. (R. 338, 1070). 
20. Nelson believes that Dearholt actually believed the purported statements 
attributed to him at the time he allegedly made those statements. And no one from BJC 
ever said that they did not intend to pay under the contract. (R. 339, 1073). 
21. Heatsource began the alleged extra work it claims was the subject of the 
implied in fact contract in May 2001, prior to the purported statements made by BJC. 
Nelson testified that he began work on the "second generation" or "U-bent" technology 
in May 2001, without any promise from BJC of being paid for such work. (R. 339, 
1445). Specifically, Nelson testified: 
Q. And so at that time, you undertook work that you believe 
was beyond the scope of your contract with DCS? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Without any promise of being paid for that work? 
A. Without a promise, I would say yes. 
Q. He never promised you that you would be compensated 
for your work at that time, did he, Jim Hylton? 
A. No, he made no specific promise. 
Q. So between May 14th and June 27th, you continued to 
work on heat probes without any specific promise from 
Bechtel Jacobs that you would get paid for that work? 
Q. Yeah, I didn't have a specific promise. 
(R. 340, 1070-71). 
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22. The June 27, 2001 meeting was a status meeting on the progress that DMP 
and its subcontractors (DCS and Heatsource) were making on producing the heater probe 
system related to the contract between BJC and DMP. In fact, BJC was concerned that 
DMP was behind schedule and wanted to know the status and estimated date of 
completion. (R. 1071). 
23. Dearholt made clear at the meeting that this work related to a fixed-price 
contract, that the Spec, and heat requirement had not changed, and unless anyone present 
could show a substantial change to the Spec, BJC expected that DMP and its 
subcontractors would produce the required heater probe system as contracted for between 
BJC and DMP. (R. 1071). 
24. Dearholt explained to those present at the meeting that BJC did not have a 
preference regarding what process or technology was used, it just needed DMP and its 
subcontractors to produce the heater probe system pursuant to the Spec, and according to 
the contract between BJC and DMP. (R. 1071). 
25. At the meeting, Dearholt told Nelson that BJC did not have a contract with 
Heatsource, but that Heatsource's deal was with DMP or DCS, and if Heatsource wanted 
a new contract, it would have to look to DMP or DCS. (R. 1072). 
26. At the meeting Dearholt stated to all those present that this project uwas not 
going to become a research and development project." (R. 1072). 
27. Heatsource has admitted that there was no discussion with BJC about time 
and materials payment on June 27, 2001. (R. 1446). 
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28. At the meeting, Dearholt told Nelson that BJC was not going to back the 
money truck up to make DMP or its subcontractors rich. (R. 1072). 
29. BJC did not have a meeting of the minds with Heatsource, did not agree to 
any contractual terms related to the heater probe system, did not agree to different terms 
from the DMP contract related to price, costs of labor, costs of materials, quantity, who 
was to direct the work, how the work was to be performed, where the work would be 
performed, or how Heatsource would be paid. BJC did not, therefore, enter into a 
contract with Heatsource. (R. 1072). 
30. Heatsource alleged and admitted that its purported contract with BJC 
continued to change in terms even after the June 27, 2001 meeting, and without the 
participation of BJC itself, the supposed other party to the agreement. Nelson was asked 
if the June 27, 2001 contract continued to grow, expand, and change terms throughout the 
two months that Heatsource was doing the work. His response was: "[w]ell, I think the 
objective of the—yes, I would say that it broadened and solidified." (R. 1072). In 
addition, Nelson testified: 
Q. Okay. So I guess I'm left wondering, then—a few 
minutes ago you mentioned that this contract continued to 
change— 
A. Sure. 
Q. -after June 27th? 
A. Right 
(R. 1072-73). 
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31. BJC and Heatsource had no discussions regarding when Heatsource would 
be paid for the alleged "extra work." 
Q. You discussed that term when you would be paid with a 
Bechtel Jacobs representative? 
A. No. 
(R. 1073). 
32. Nelson testified that BJC told him that it believed that Heatsource should be 
paid, but that payment should be from Heatsource's contracting party, not from BJC. (R. 
339, 1073, 1308). 
33. Heatsource's sole basis for claiming that the statements allegedly made by 
Dearholt at the June 27, 2001 meeting were fraudulent is that Heatsource did not get paid 
what it later demanded. Heatsource provided no other facts to support its fraud claim. 
Q. Do you or do you not have any other facts that support 
this allegation other than what you've said which you believe 
is not being paid? 
A. No, I'm basing this on not being paid. 
(R. 339). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err when it granted BJC's two motions for summary 
judgment based on the undisputed facts that were never controverted by Heatsource. 
Even now, in its appeal to this Court, Heatsource relies on the stricken affidavit of 
Andrew Nelson (the 'Nelson Affidavit") and facts raised for the first time on appeal. 
Importantly, Heatsource makes no mention of the facts that were deemed admitted below, 
and in fact, does not even cite to the record in many instances. Most problematic is that 
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Heatsource has not identified any instances of error on the part of the trial court. 
Moreover, Heatsource has not identified any genuine issues of material fact that the trial 
court failed to recognize or give proper credence to. 
Instead of committing errors, the trial court correctly ruled on each issue below. 
With respect to the undisputed facts, the trial court correctly found that the facts were 
deemed admitted because Heatsource had failed, both times, to controvert the facts set 
forth by BJC. This was well within the trial court's discretion. Similarly, the trial court 
appropriately ordered stricken the Nelson Affidavit for various reasons, including that it 
was contradictory to his own prior deposition testimony, it was conclusory, self-serving, 
and speculative. This again, was a proper decision of the lower court. Significantly, 
Heatsource has not appealed these decisions and without challenging them in its Brief, 
has waived its opportunity to challenge them. As a result, the undisputed facts as 
accepted by the trial court should also be all deemed admitted and undisputed on appeal. 
With respect to the underlying claims raised in this appeal, the trial court's rulings 
were correct. In its Complaint, Heatsource alleged claims for unjust enrichment, breach 
of implied covenant, quantum meruit, and for fraud. BJC's motion focused on each of 
these claims. Specifically, the trial court found that Heatsource's unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit claims "are identical and are equitable in nature, such that they may only 
be brought in the absence of an express contract over the subject matter of the underlying 
work performed." (R. 909). This ruling is supported by the undisputed facts which 
establish that BJC contracted with DMP, DMP subcontracted with DCS, and then DCS 
subcontracted the heater portion with Heatsource. These contracts and subcontracts 
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related precisely to the work to be performed by Heatsource and therefore any unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit claims are barred as a matter of law. 
As to the fraud claim, the trial court properly found that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed and that as a matter of law, BJC was entitled to summary judgment. 
The trial court found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Heatsource could not 
establish the requisite elements of a fraud claim because Heatsource could not show: (1) a 
false statement concerning a presently existing fact; (2) that a BJC representative knew 
such statement to be false; and (3) that Heatsource detrimentally relied on any allegedly 
false statement by BJC. The trial court was correct, the decision is supported by the 
undisputed facts, and Heatsource has not shown any error in this regard. 
With respect to Heatsource's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claim, the trial court correctly found that it fails as a matter of law. Such an 
implied covenant is only imposed in express contracts between parties. The trial court 
found that there was no direct contract between BJC into which an implied covenant 
could be imposed. The undisputed facts strongly support this determination, as does the 
fact that BJC never pled a breach of contract claim. Moreover, the trial court 
appropriately held that even if an implied covenant existed, BJC had acted fairly and in 
good faith. The undisputed facts fully support this ruling. 
Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court allowed Heatsource to amend its 
complaint to assert a claim for breach of implied in fact contract. In the Second 
Amended Complaint, Heatsource alleged a claim for breach of implied in fact contract 
and again asserted a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. 
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In response, BJC filed its second motion for summary judgment. In that context, the trial 
court again made similar evidentiary rulings related to Heatsource's failure to controvert 
the facts and the previous striking of the Nelson Affidavit. These rulings were supported 
by the law and were well within the trial court's purview. 
As to the implied in fact claim, the trial court found that Heatsource could not 
establish the requisite elements of such a claim, especially in light of the parties' conduct 
that indicated there was no direct contract between BJC and Heatsource. The undisputed 
facts clearly support this finding and show that there was no meeting of the minds, no 
essential terms for a contract, and no conduct to suggest a direct contract between 
Heatsource and BJC. Thus, the grant of summary judgment on the claim is appropriate. 
Significantly, Heatsource has not appealed the dismissal of the implied in fact contract 
claim, has not listed this as an issue for appeal, and has not briefed the issue. 
Consequently, this ruling is not before the Court. With respect to the breach of implied 
covenant claim, the trial court appropriately found again that in the absence of an express 
contract or implied in fact contract, there could be no covenant claim. This ruling is also 
supported by the law and undisputed facts. 
In short, the trial court was very careful and cautious in making the various rulings 
granting summary judgment to BJC. The trial court was prepared at each hearing, had 
astutely reviewed the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, and meticulously 
considered the issues in rendering its decisions—drafting a well-reasoned opinion on the 
second summary judgment motion. The trial court was a model of appropriate judicial 
process, understood the applicable law, and correctly applied that law to the undisputed 
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facts. Nothing in Heatsource's Brief sufficiently finds fault with the actions of the trial 
court or establishes any reversible error. Consequently, this Court should uphold the 
decisions of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AND DEEMED BJC'S 
FACTS UNDISPUTED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Found that BJC's Facts Were Undisputed, 
and Deemed the Facts Admitted, Because Heatsource Failed to 
Properly Controvert BJC's Facts. 
The trial court properly deemed all of BJC's facts undisputed because Heatsource 
failed to controvert the facts set forth in BJC's motions. "[A] trial court may exercise its 
discretion to require compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly 
rule 4-501, without impairing a party's substantive rights." Fennell II v. Green, 2003 UT 
App 291, j^ 9, 77 P.3d 339. The Fennell court properly deemed all facts admitted in that 
case because the party opposing the motion failed to controvert the facts. Id As the 
Supreme Court explained in Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist., 2002 UT 130, f 50, 63 
P.3d 705, u[u]nder Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, all 
facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.'" 
(citation omitted). 
With respect to BJC's first motion for summary judgment, the trial court held: 
Based on Heatsource's failure to comply with the 
requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7, as well 
as Heatsource's failure to controvert the evidence submitted 
by BJC to support its undisputed material facts, the Court 
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finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
accepts as undisputed, the material facts set forth by BJC in 
its moving papers. 
2005 Order, Addendum A at p. 1. Similarly, in its 2006 Order on BJC's second motion 
for suniinaiN iiidgment, tin 111 iII I I I I 
As a necessary part of my earlier ruling, I accepted BJC's 
position that plaintiff had utterly failed to comply with Rule 
7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as plaintiff 
did not specifically identify and restate BJC's statement of 
undisputed facts, and even where plaintiff claimed factual 
disputes, in virtually every instance those statements were not 
supported by citations to the record. 
2006 Order, Addendum B at pp. 3-4. 
Significantly, Heatsource is not appealing the tiial couil s decision to deem 
admitted all of BJC's facts for Heatsource's failure to controvert. Indeed, Heatsource 
makes no mention of the trial court's decision to deem admitted all tit these facts in either 
its Docketing Statement or in its Brief to this Court. Therefore, any potential challenge to 
this decision has been waived and the Court need not consider it. See Brown v. Glover, 
20il 1 1 89,1[2:> lh I i vl<) (gnieullv issues not presentt cl in the opening brief are 
considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court)(citations omitted); 
State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, If 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 894 (it is inappropriate to raise 
issues il ouil n i in lint "have n< »1 liu n il % i^ n ited as issues on tf f ill in lln* 
docketing statement or in the briefs."). 
Even if Heatsource had appealed the above decisions, the trial court was well 
within I diii i In i h illtvinllN lul nihil pulul h III I lire's failure to controvert 
those facts. See Fennell II at 1f 9; see also Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, fflf 
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8, 11, 156 P.3d 175 ("Defendants' opposing memorandum . . . did not include a coherent 
explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required by rule 7(c)(3)(B). . . . Thus, we 
are unpersuaded that Defendants substantially complied with rule 7(c)(3)(B), and we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment based on Defendants' noncompliance with rule 
7(c)(3)(B)."). 
Likewise, in this case, Heatsource did not even attempt to comply with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and this disregard for the rules made it nearly impossible for 
B JC and the trial court to decipher what facts, if any, Heatsource disputed. Moreover, 
Heatsource did not merely fail once to properly controvert the facts submitted by BJC, 
but it failed twice, as it failed to properly controvert the facts submitted by BJC to 
support its second motion for summary judgment as well. This second failure is 
inexcusable after having the rules highlighted by BJC in its reply in support of its first 
motion for summary judgment, as well as having the trial court expressly rule as it did on 
the first motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the facts set forth in this Brief 
must be accepted as undisputed as the trial court properly deemed the facts admitted by 
Heatsource based on its repeated failures to controvert the evidence. These facts, when 
considered and applied to the appropriate law (discussed below), demonstrate that the 
trial court properly granted BJC's motions for summary judgment because no genuine 
issue of material fact existed. 
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B. The Nelson Affidavit Was Appropriately Stricken by the Trial Coiirt, 
and is Improperly Cited in Heatsource's Brief to This Cour t 
Heatsource has disregarded the trial court's appropriate decision to strike the 
Nelson Affidavit, attached as Addendum 3 to Brief of Appellant. Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that evidence and affidavits :oi isic lei ed for si in tt t mi y 
judgment "be made on personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence" and implicitly requires that affidavits not be conclusory in form 
or contaii 1 \ n i,si lbstai itiatec 1 o{ >inioi is oi 1 >eliefs. See Gaw v. Utah P e p t of Iransp. , ' 798 
P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Regarding the Nelson Affidavit, the trial court 
held: 
BJC properly asked the Court to disregard that Affidavit, 
because it came subsequent to Mr. Nelson's voluminous 
deposition, and it was inconsistent with or contradicted 
deposition testimony. I am not sure that I expressly ruled that 
the Affidavit should be stricken, but it was inherent in my 
prior ruling that plaintiff had failed to adequately rebut at 
least the first 28 claimed undisputed facts asserted by BJC 
and at this time I make clear that the Nelson Affidavit 
submitted in 2005 should be stricken. 
2006 Oi i let , \d( Hi :M a it it i i B i t.1 p 1 
This decis ion was wel l wi thin the discretion of the trial court because the Nelson 
Affidavit is satiated wi th evident iary problems and inadmissible s ta tements , and it 
tradicts Nelsi .ony. (R. 631-3 Il ) ' I "1 le 1 rii tl CM :)i u t 
properly struck the Nelson Affidavit for many reasons, not the least of which was the 
contradictory testimony offered in the affidavit after his deposition. See Webster v. Sill 
67:: ; i 1V83) (stating tl lat " vvhen a |; >ai !b • takes a cleai positioi i if I a 
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deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue 
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition"). As a result, the trial 
court's decision was correct and supported by the evidence. 
Heatsource has failed to properly challenge the trial court's ruling to strike the 
Nelson Affidavit. Heatsource makes no mention of the trial court's decision to strike the 
Nelson Affidavit in either its Docketing Statement or in its Brief to this Court. As such, 
any potential challenge to this decision has been waived and the Court need not consider 
it.5 Because the Nelson Affidavit was properly stricken by the trial court and Heatsource 
is not appealing that decision, all references to it in Heatsource's Brief should be 
disregarded and stricken by this Court. Also, the "Test Results" submitted by Heatsource 
as Addendum 2 and Addendum 4 to its Brief should be stricken from the record because 
these "Test Results" were only before the trial court as exhibits to the Nelson Affidavit. 
Since the evidence in Addenda 2 and 4 was stricken from the record by the trial court, it 
should be disregarded and stricken by this Court as well. In addition, the following 
arguments and statements in Heatsource's Brief should be stricken and disregarded by 
this Court because they are based on the above, improper evidence: 
• Page 8, numbered paragraph 6; 
• Pages 8-9, numbered paragraphs 9 and 10; and 
• Page 23, all portions of first full paragraph related to the Nelson Affidavit.6 
5
 See Brown, at f 23; Arviso, at J^ 4 n. 2. 
6
 This is not an exhaustive list of all statements in Heatsource's Brief that are improperly 
based on the Nelson Affidavit. Indeed, most of the factual assertions in Heatsource's 
Brief are based on the Nelson Affidavit, even though not attributed as such, and should 
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C, All Evidence and Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal by 
Heatsource Must Be Stricken and Not Considered by the C o u r t 
Heatsource raises new facts and issues in its Brief and Addendum that were never 
presented to or considered by the trial court during the summary judgment briefing and 
I • - * rhese fa< .H. ...• herefore, i lot): >t : pei ly before tl le Coi u t 
and they must be stricken and disregarded by the Court on appeal. See Lovendahl ^ 51-
52 ("[t]his court will not consider evidence not made part of the record on appeal.") It is 
ft u idai i lei italb ' i in lfaii t : • l i t igants , as wel l as to the ti ial : :>i n t to :oi isidei ev idei ice at id 
arguments on appeal that were not submitted to or considered by the trial court and the 
parties below. The following evidence is raised for the first time on appeal by 
Heatsource an 
• Addendum 3, an affidavit of Andrew Nelson submitted in opposition to 
BJC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This affidavit was not 
submitted to or considered by the trial cour t at the summary judgment stage; 
• Addendum 7, portions of the deposition transcript of Andrew Nelson. 
Except for transcript page 19, none of these deposition transcript pages were 
submitted to or considered by the trial court; 
• Addendum 8, the deposition transcript of Daniel Schwender. Neither the 
coi- his depositioi i , i tot the c leposition transcript itself, were :•*, * i to or 
considered by the trial court; 
be disregarded. This list only addresses the portions that Heatsource actually cited as 
emanating from the Nelson Affidavit. 
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• Addendum 9, an affidavit of John Richard Dearholt submitted in support of 
BJC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This affidavit was not 
submitted to or considered by the trial court at the summary judgment stage; 
• Addendum 10, a purported expert report by a Dr. Noel de Nevers. Neither 
the content of this report, nor the report itself, were submitted to or considered by 
the trial court; and 
• Addendum 13, various non-authenticated emails, the content of which, nor 
the emails themselves, were submitted to or considered by the trial court. 
Because the above evidence is not properly before the court, a significant portion 
of Heatsource's Brief should also be disregarded and stricken because the arguments are 
based on this improper evidence. Specifically, the following arguments and statements in 
Heatsource's Brief should be stricken and disregarded by this Court: 
• Page 4, first paragraph, first two sentences; 
• Pages 11 -12, all portions of numbered paragraph 17 that refer or relate to 
any deposition testimony of Nelson (except for deposition transcript page 19); 
• Pages 12-13, numbered paragraphs 20-22; 
• Pages 13-14, all portions of numbered paragraph 23 below the line on page 
13 as they refer to the deposition of Schwender; 
• Pages 16-17, entire block quote from deposition of Nelson; 
• Page 23, all portions of the first two full paragraphs that relate to deposition 
testimony of Schwender or Nelson; 
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• Page 24, entire page as the statements are exclusively derived from 
• * ddend; t ( ); ii ),< 1 1 ;: !, , 
• Page 2 5 , entire pa ragraph designated as paragraph " ( 2 ) " related to 
A d d e n d u m 13; and 
• Page 27, ei itire paragi apl i be gini ii:t ig \ v itl i ""Ii; i : ;)i iti: ast" tl i,at i elies i ipc i i ai id 
sets forth purported deposition testimony from Todd Lindstrom which was not 
submitted to or considered by the trial court. 
D. All Facts Not Properly Cited to and Supported by the Rec ci i cl in 
Heatsource ' s Brief Should be Disregarded by the Court . 
Heatsource has utterly failed to comply wi th Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules o f 
i Appellate I :,i ocedi n e ;i >l lie! 11 :x \\ lii e s tl lat ' |a]ll statei t ici its of fact ai id i eferences to tl lie 
proceedings be low shall be suppor ted by citations to the record . . . . UTAH R. A P P . 
PROC. 24(a)(7) . A thorough review of Hea t source ' s Statement of Fact reveals very few 
citations t : • tl le i: ecoi :!! ' I I lose facts tl lat at e pi e: ;ei ited v 'itl 101 it • : i tatioi is t :: tl le it e :oi :1 
should not be considered by this Court. See Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "we only consider those facts properly cited 
Here, most of the purported facts in Heatsource's Brief are based on the evidence 
that should be stricken Alternatively, miich like the conclusory and unsubstantiated 
• ' •
 !
-wit—whi ::! I 'as sti ickei I tl lese pi it poi ted facts are i nei el) ' 
unsupported conjecture with no factual support in the record. Consequently, the Court 
should not consider the following evidence found in the Statement of Fact in 
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Heatsource's Brief: Paragraphs 1-2, 5, everything after the first sentence in paragraph 6, 
paragraph 8, everything after the first sentence in paragraph 10, paragraphs 11-14, 
everything after the first sentence in paragraph 15, and paragraph 23. 
The facts set forth in the above paragraphs are not properly cited to or supported 
by the record. As a result, this evidence and related arguments should be disregarded and 
should not be allowed to create a disputed material fact. The rules of procedure are 
designed to prevent a party and its counsel from merely submitting its own thoughts or an 
unsubstantiated factual narrative on appeal. Heatsource should be held to the standards 
required by the rules and therefore, the above information should be disregarded. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HEATSOURCE'S 
FRAUD CLAIM 
The trial court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed with 
respect to Heatsource's fraud claim and that as a matter of law, BJC was entitled to 
summary judgment. (R 910-11). Specifically, the court found that the undisputed facts 
demonstrated that Heatsource could not establish the requisite elements of a fraud claim 
because Heatsource could not show a false statement concerning a presently existing fact, 
could not show that any BJC representative knew such statement to be false, and because 
Heatsource could not show detrimental reliance. (Id.). 
BJC agrees with the elements of a fraud claim set forth in Heatsource's Brief (p. 
16). However, none of the supposed evidence cited by Heatsource to support the 
arguments in its Brief is admissible since it was not submitted to the trial court. (See 
Motion to Strike, filed concurrently herewith). Moreover, the undisputed facts actually 
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submitted to the trial court demonstrate that Heatsource cannot prevail on a fraud claim. 
I Jtah coi irts "have stressed, at id coi itit 11 u :; to 1 iolc 1 tl lat i r lei e coi lclusory allegations in a 
pleading, unsupported by recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to 
preclude . . . summary judgment ." Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2001 1 1 1 2 5 , j | 36, 21 P 3d 198 h id< :< %I,< i < u )i i rf >1; l i i i t s i , i l i d b< : c lismiss* :d if tl i< : 
plaintiff fails to " ' se t forth in specific terms the time, place, content, and manner of each 
defendant 's alleged material misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct . '" 
Coroles v. Sabev. 2003 U I App 339, )\ 28 n. 15, 79 P.3d 974 (citation omitted). 
Here, Heatsource did not plead its fraud claim with particularity, and failed to 
allege any specific representations made by BJ V1ten they were made, who made them, 
how they were false, or how Heatsource detrimentally relied on such representations. (R. 
1 5) Even if the claim were pled with sufficient particularity, BJC was entitled to 
summary judgment because Heatsource earn lot establisl i tl ie i equisite elen ici its :)f a ft ai i< i 
claim. In his deposition testimony, Nelson claimed that the only statements made to him 
by BJC were to the effect that: ' 'x " Heatsource could produce the required heat probes, 
tl lei i it < :)i ild be takei i cai e of ; (2) tl lat tl ie pi p ject 1 lad i i :,) * v bee- :>.n ie a researcl i. ait id 
development project; and (3) if the heat probes were completed, BJC would back the 
money truck up to the building. (R. 338, 1070). Nelson claims that these statements 
were n / • '* 
statements were never repeated by BJC either before or at any time thereafter. (Id.) 
7
 While several people attended the meeting, no one else has testified to hearing these 
alleged statements. (R. 338 n 1). Nelson never repeated these purported representations 
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For several reasons, these purported statements and Heatsource's conduct are 
insufficient to establish fraud, and Heatsource cannot prove the requisite elements of its 
claim. First, under Utah law the "simple failure to pay [under a contract] does not 
constitute fraud." DeBrv v. Cascade Enters.. 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994). Here, as 
explained by Nelson in his deposition, Heatsource exclusively bases its fraud claim on 
"not being paid" by BJC and has no other facts to support this claim. (R. 339). As a 
matter of law, this does not constitute fraud and Heatsource's claim fails. 
Second, the evidence shows that BJC did not act fraudulently or make any 
intentionally false statements. (R. 338). In fact, Nelson opined that Dearholt believed 
that Heatsource should get paid and at the time he purportedly made the above 
statements, that Dearholt believed the alleged statements. (R. 339, 1073). Significantly, 
in its response to BJC's first motion for summary judgment, Heatsource stated that "[i]t 
may therefore be inferred that BJC did intend to pay." (R. 667). This inference, which 
was raised and supported by Heatsource, clearly demonstrates that BJC did not act 
fraudulently or make any statements without the intent to follow through on those 
statements. This fact alone, which again, was presented by Heatsource, clearly defeats 
Heatsource's fraud claim because it establishes that Heatsource cannot show the second, 
third and fourth elements of its claim—that a representation concerning a presently 
existing material fact was false, and the representor either knew it to be false or made it 
recklessly without sufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation. 
to DMP or DCS, even though they met immediately after the June 27, 2001 meeting to 
put together a letter to BJC. (Id.) Nor were the purported comments raised in the request 
for equitable adjustment. (Id.) 
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Third, the purported statements were not actually false. It is undisputed that BJC 
paid 'W lb, 798 HI H In its conli u 1 ID JJMP at I IK >anu' loialion wbnc tin pnrpnifnl 
"money truck" would have backed up. (R. 337, 1069). Even i i a tfcmoney truck" 
statement was made, certainly paying $ /1 <>, /98 represents a driving of a money truck 
lrom BM ' to MMI* Moreover, there is no evidence to show that BJC intended not to pay, 
and in fact, Nelson testified that BJC believed that Heatsource should be paid, not by 
UK , bul In the party Heatsource contracted with. (K. i W. Ill i| llius the facts show 
that BJC paid a substantial amount of money for this project to DMP believing that the 
money would flow downhill to the subcontractors, including Heatsource, such thai 
everyone in the process won hi Iv taken careol V, an li II \itsource cannot shn\s that 
the statements were actually false and its fraud claim fails. 
Finally, Heatsource cannot show detrimental reliance on the purported 
lepieseutations. "One critical i lemnil nl | i li iiui| an nl H li in is ai dial icliano on a 
false representation." DeBry, 879 P.2d at 13i8. A plaintiff must show that 'reliance was 
placed on such acts or representations" or there is no injury. Voorhees v. Fisher, 34 P 
<vl t\l> (1 l t , ih III" 'I I liiiini In iiiiiill lit n p i i i i i t i l l \\ 11 m 1 m l l n e i x nil In null III I m i l i Is n n mr 
fraudulent representations). Significantly, reliance cannot be shown when the plaintiff 
undertakes the conduct—which it later claims it would not have taken—before the time 
(In puipurtnli picsetitatioii \wiw i In ill maih see Allen v. Htzgeraid, in II1 i>92, 594 
(Utah 1901) (reliance not shown when improvements placed on land w cic not induced by 
any promise or representation). For example, in Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 
MUM I M I I \ i i II I1 \\\ 11 ii i m i l l i i . i i o l Ih ill flu- p l . i n i l i l l null I I h . n e 
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detrimentally relied upon a job cost detail report because it was not available to the 
plaintiff until long after the plaintiff had taken the actions that constituted its claimed 
injury. In other words, the plaintiff had made all payments prior to receiving the job cost 
detail report so the plaintiff could not show detrimental reliance because it received the 
job cost detail report after it had already undertaken its performance obligation. IdL 
Likewise, the trial court here correctly found that Heatsource cannot show 
detrimental reliance on any statements by BJC. As noted above, Heatsource was required 
to produce the heater probe under its contract with DCS. (R. 335-36, 1067-68). As such, 
all of its work that forms the basis of this dispute was required under the terms of its 
agreement with DCS, and certainly within the scope of work for which BJC contracted 
with DMP. (R. 333-37, 1066-69). Thus, Heatsource undertook this work well before the 
June 27, 2001 meeting. (R. 335, 1067). Furthermore, even if Heatsource somehow 
claims that there was additional work that it undertook, outside the scope of its contract 
with DCS, the fact is that Heatsource undertook that worker/or to the purported 
statements made by BJC. (R. 339-40, 1070-71, 1445). Nelson testified that he began the 
work on the "second generation" or "u-bent" technology in May 2001 without any 
promise of being paid for such work. (R. 339, 1445). Accordingly, Heatsource 
undertook the work, that it now claims was fraudulently induced by BJC on June 27, 
2001, in May 2001 and well before the June 27, 2001 meeting. Thus, Heatsource cannot 
show detrimental reliance on any purported statements made two months after it 
undertook work on the so-called uu-bent" technology. 
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For the above reasons, the trial court correctly found that "since Heatsource cannot 
establish tii. ;- msite elements of a fra/i id claim, and has not created a genuine issue of 
material fact or otherwise controverted the evidence submitted by BJC as undisputed, 
BJC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law " (R 9 I  0 1 1). Il he trial coi irt 
coi il :! i i,c: t be n lore correct , at id this Coi n t should uphold the decision. 
III. T H E T R I A L C O U R T P R O P E R L Y D I S M I S S E D H E A T S O U R C E ' S 
U N J U S T E N R I C H M E N T C L A I M ( S ) 8 
I 'oh its II ait id III1 ' : f 1 1 sats :>i it ce's Bi ie f both state tl i,e at gi in lei it tl tat the ti ial :oi n It 
erred in dismissing the "Unjust Enrichment" claim(s) of Heatsource. BJC cannot 
determine any distinction between the arguments in these two sections, and does not 
i inderstai id wl i;; tl lei e are two idei itical legal sectioi is Hi i< ieed , tl ic sai i le stai idai d foi a 
contract implied in law/unjust enrichment is set forth in both sections (compare pp. 25 
and \* -t Heatsource's Briel ,v both sections of Heatsource's : v discuss alleged 
Heatsource has argued in Points II and IV of its Brief that it is entitled to recover 
under an implied in law/unjust enrichment theory, claiming that BJC received a benefit, 
that BJC acknowledged the benefit, and that it would be unjust for BJC to retain the 
As case law explains, "quantum meruit" is the broad umbrella term for quasi contract 
claims and has two distinct branches: contracts implied in law and those implied in fact. 
Scheller v.Dixie Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The first branch, 
implied in law, is synonymous with a claim for unjust enrichment. Knight v. Post 748 
P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Heatsource's Brief, only claim(s) for implied 
in law/unjust enrichment are discussed. To avoid confusion, BJC will use the terms 
"implied in law" and "unjust enrichment" interchangeably herein, and avoid, where 
appropriate, using the term "quantum meruit." 
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benefit without paying for it. (Heatsource's Brief, 25, 30-31). The trial court, however, 
correctly found that Heatsource's implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) were barred. 
It is well settled that an unjust enrichment claim fails when an actual contract 
exists that covers the scope of the performance—the same performance that purportedly 
gave an unjust benefit to the other party. Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 
461, 465 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme Court explained in American Towers Owners 
Assoc. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996): 
[I]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express 
contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of 
unjust enrichment. Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract is not 
available where there is an express contract covering the 
subject matter of the litigation."); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Recovery under quantum 
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral 
contract exists.") 
Accord UTCO Assocs., Ltd. v. Zimmerman, 2001 UT App 117, ^ 22, 27 P.3d 177 
(holding that "plaintiff could not recover under quantum meruit because he had failed to 
exhaust his legal remedies" which consisted of contract claims); Wood v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35, % 10, 19 P.3d 392 (holding that "recovery under unjust 
enrichment theory is available only when 'no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists'") (citation omitted); Lvsenko v. Sawava. 1999 UT App 31, If 13, 973 P.2d 445 
("'if a legal remedy is available . . . the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment'") (citation omitted). Indeed, "[rjecovery under quantum meruit presupposes 
that no enforceable contract exists." Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Gravstone Pines 
Homeowners' Assoc, 789 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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In American Towers, a homeowners association brought suit against contractors 
ai id si lbcontractoi s foi i u lyi ist ei 11 icl n i lei it 1 he coi 11  t explaii led: 
In this case, each defendant is party to a construction contract 
that addresses the specific subject matter of the Associatioi f s 
unjust enrichment claim. The contracting parties were 
apparently satisfied with each other 's performance because 
they each paid the contract price and accepted the work 
performed as meeting their contract terms. The Association, 
a stranger to these contracts, cannot now demand that 
defendants adjust the contract price by complaining that 
defendants were unjustly enriched. See Knight v. Post, 748 
P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (denying quantum 
meruit claim against nonparty to construction contract). 
Id.; see also U T C O , fflj 24-26 (noting that contractor must pursue proper contract claims 
agaii ist I'lMitnuliii^ paih itul M illt llntHI 11.• • IH, I 
In Malonev v. Therm Alum Indus., Corp., 636 So.2d 767, 768-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App 1994), a case cited with approval by this Court in UTCO, supra, the court explained 
1:1: mt a si ibcoi iti actoi in n ist pi it si i z"" I lis (lit e ::t i en led;; ' against 1:1 le • :oi iti actoi " i athet thai I 
pursue the landowner (who received the benefit and had contracted with the contractor) 
because the subcontractor had no contractual relationship w itii the landowner. The 
Malonev cowl tu i t l r i < i\pljiitul dial before stvknu!" ,tn n\\\vA « Murium il ilifi11 W "iiust 
pursue his direct contractual remedy against the contractor. Id. 
Here, the above authorities support the trial c o i n I s determination that 
Heatsource 's claims for "Unjust Enrichment" and " ()i lai ttin i i IV len lit" "ai e idei itical ai id 
are equitable in nature, such that they may only be brought in the absence of an express 
contract over the subject matter of the underlying work performed.' (R 909) Fhe trial 
coi u t f"i n tl iei sfoi u id that 1:1 le i in< lispi ited facts established tl tat B IC cot iti acted w iti i DMP, 
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which then subcontracted with DCS, which later subcontracted with Heatsource, and that 
the "work performed by Heatsource related to the production of the five-zone heaters was 
subject to, and within the scope of, the express contracts and subcontracts involved." (R. 
910; see also, R. 1446, where the trial court explained: "Based on already admitted facts, 
the work performed by Heatsource was part of its obligations under its subcontract with 
DCS. Heatsource admitted that the work it was required to do under its subcontract with 
DCS equally describes work for "U-bent" heaters and non-U-bent heaters."). 
Consequently, the trial court properly determined that these claims failed as a matter of 
law since the work that formed the basis of these equitable claims was also entirely 
covered by and within the scope of the express contracts and subcontracts. Id.9 
The trial court's decision is not only an accurate reflection of the law, but is also a 
correct application of the law to the undisputed facts in this case. Specifically, the work 
performed by Heatsource was covered by and the subject of a set of express subcontracts. 
The undisputed facts show that BJC issued an RFP for a fixed price contract and accepted 
DMP's bid. (R. 333-34, 1066-67).l0 The contract between BJC and DMP required that 
DMP produce a heater probe system pursuant to the Spec. (R. 334, 1066). DMP then 
9
 Although the implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) were not the subject of the 
Second Amended Complaint or the second summary judgment motion, the trial court 
confirmed its prior ruling stating: "After carefully reconsidering all of the applicable 
case law, I am persuaded that both contract implied in law and contract implied in fact 
theories are barred if enforceable contracts exist covering the same subject matter. (See 
cases cited in BJC's opening memorandum, which cases address both branches of quasi 
contract. . . .)" (R. 1447). 
10
 When a party makes a bid on a fixed price contract, which is then accepted and 
awarded, the bidder generally bears the risk of not being paid overage costs if the actual 
costs go above the fixed price. (R. 343 n. 2). 
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subcontracted " n r ^ a portion of the work to produce a heater probe (R 335 106'7) 
DCS ti lei i soi lgl it oi it I leatsoi u ce, v 't ic t epi esei itec 1 tl lat it had expertise it i prepai it ig 
heater probes, and subcontracted with Heatsource to have Heatsource produce a heater 
probe. (Tcj . IUS, there can be no dispute related to the cllaiii of contracts: BJC 
foiifiMt/tnl Willi I >M1J, who in i• Ji • i "Jiihconlrarlnl with DCS, who in turn subcontracted 
with Heatsource. (R. 334-35, 1066-67) I ikewise, there is no dispute that the work 
performed by Heatsource was subject to its subcontract with . S, was covered by an 
express contract, ai id tl lat Heatsource was required to pi oduce the heaters for the System. 
(R. 335-36, 1067-68). Even the work on the new "solution" or "U-bent" technology was 
part of Heatsource's obligation under its subcontract witl i D( 'S (K. 3 ><» I f l<>*) 
Heatsource's self-created uncertainty in the heater temperature, based on its own 
conjecture about a moving target on suclI temperatures is immaterial and does not create 
a genuine issue of material fiu: I Despite its slalftitnil I tin rnntiaiN iiiiii mis Brief, • 
Heatsource has repeatedly admitted that the S p e c , the only document that applied to the 
heater probe system being prepared, never changed. (R. 336, 1068, 1400). Section 
2.5.2.4 • :»f tt le Spec. 1; las alwa> s stated tl lat tl le """"I: leatei s si lall be capable of si ista.ii led 
operation at a temperature of 800°C." (R. 486). Furthermore, while Heatsource now 
attempts to create something out of various project documents, Heatsource also claims 
tl tat it :li: :1 it lot se :: tl le Spec m intil • i i s X F < • "nt ;; > in 1 t l lis litigatioi i (1 leatsoi n ce' s Brief, 26) 
11
 Significantly, in Heatsource's Opposition Memorandum to the first motion for 
summary judgment it admitted: "The probe system was sub-contracted out to [DMP] 
who in turn sub-contracted out part of the system to [DCS] DCS subcontracted the 
probe heaters to the Plaintiff, Heatsource." (R. 656 ). 
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While that is not accurate (See R. 1400), it is important to note that Heatsource did not 
receive the documents in Addendum 11 (the Huxtable sheets) or Addendum 12 (April 
2001 Test Plan) until discovery in this matter. Thus, Heatsource cannot rely on 
documents it never had at the relevant time. This issue is immaterial and does not create 
a genuine issue of fact. 
Furthermore, even if there was a purported deficiency or change in the 
temperatures, such a change was not due to BJC, as Heatsource has admitted that BJC's 
Spec, never changed. (R. 336). As any misunderstanding could not be attributed to BJC, 
the trial court correctly found that "[t]o the extent Heatsource is claiming a defective or 
deficient temperature specification, that is a claim that must be addressed, if at all, within 
the express contractual framework." (R. 1447). That is, any purported deficiency was 
due to a verbal statemient by DCS to Heatsource, not by BJC, and therefore, any recourse 
must be on the subcontract between DCS and Heatsource. 
In conclusion, because the work performed by Heatsource was within the scope of 
an express contract and conducted pursuant to that express contract or subcontracts, 
Heatsource cannot, as a matter of law, assert unjust enrichment or quantum meruit claims 
against BJC—especially here, where, like American Towers, the other direct contracting 
parties have no dispute with BJC.13 Moreover, Heatsource's only attempt to meet the 
To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC 
incorporates its arguments from the briefing below. (R. 891-92, 1400, 1404, 1420-21). 
13
 Despite Heatsource's statement that it fulfilled its subcontract with DCS, and for that 
reason it did not file suit against DCS, the statement is conclusory and unsupported. In 
fact, DCS has a stayed cross-claim for breach of contract and quantum meruit against 
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second required element of an unjust enrichment claim (acknowledgment of a benefit) 
fails because the evidence it exclusively relies upon to support that assertion is found in 
Addendum 13, which, as discussed above, is not properly before this Court. Thus, the 
trial court's entry of summary judgment was appropriate and should be upheld.14 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT HEATSOURCE'S 
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER 
OF LAW SHOULD BE UPHELD 
This Court should uphold the decision to dismiss Heatsource's breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. Utah law generally implies a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in all contractual relationships. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 
0997): St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). 
However, the covenant is only implied where there is an express contract between the 
parties. See generally Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21, 116 P.3d 259. 
Thus, if there is no direct contractual relationship between Heatsource and BJC, then the 
claim fails as a matter of law. Here, Heatsource has not properly pled a direct contract or 
an implied in fact contract, and more importantly, Heatsource has not appealed the 
decision of the trial court finding that no such contracts exist. Consequently, as explained 
Heatsource. (R. 246-49). Thus, Heatsource cannot unilaterally take the position it 
completed its contract with DCS when the record shows that DCS has an opposite view. 
14
 It is worth noting that the trial court never waivered in its position that the existence of 
a set of express subcontracts covering the subject matter of the purported implied in 
law/unjust enrichment claims precluded such claims. That position is unassailable. 
However, "out of an abundance of caution [the trial court] gave plaintiff leave to file a 
Second Amended Complaint, which Complaint was specifically limited to any claim for 
contract implied in fact." (R. 1442). The trial court correctly found on the second 
summary judgment that the existence of the express subcontracts also barred an implied 
in fact contract claim, i.e., also barred the second branch of quantum meruit claims. 
37 
below, there is no claim for breach of contract or implied in fact contract properly before 
the Court on appeal, and without either such claim, there is no contract within which an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could be imposed. As a result, the 
decision of the trial court must be upheld. 
A. Heatsource Has Never Alleged a Cause of Action for Breach of Express 
Contract and has Not Raised On Appeal Reversible Error Related to 
any Purported Express Contract. 
Heatsource never alleged the existence of an express (written or oral) contract with 
BJC directly, and Heatsource never pled a breach of contract claim directly against BJC 
in its Complaint or Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1-5, 914-920). Likewise, 
Heatsource's Brief is devoid of any arguments suggesting that a direct, express contract 
existed between Heatsource and BJC, and is also devoid of any claim that the trial court 
erred with respect to any purported breach of express contract claim. Instead, Heatsource 
has only claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing the Unjust Enrichment claim(s). 
Thus, it must be accepted that no express contract existed between Heatsource and BJC. 
The trial court correctly found that Heatsource "has not pled, and does not have, a 
direct contract, either express or implied with BJC." (R. 911). BJC further demonstrated 
that there was no meeting of the minds on a purported contract between Heatsource and 
BJC direct, that BJC lacked any intent to enter into a direct contract, and also 
demonstrated that an> purported contract lacked sufficiently definite terms to be 
enforceable. (R. 1074-77). The undisputed facts further support the trial court's finding 
since Heatsource's only direct contract was with DCS, Heatsource never made a direct 
demand to BJC for payment (but instead, invoiced DMP for its work on the "second 
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generation" heaters), and participated in a request for equitable adjustment to BJC 
through DMP—the party that had a direct contract with BJC. (R. 335-37, 1067-69).15 
As a result of these undisputed facts, the trial court found that "since no direct 
contract has been properly alleged between BJC and Heatsource, there is no implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing present between Heatsource and BJC." (R. 911). 
The trial court was correct that without the existence of a direct contract between 
Heatsource and BJC, no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can exist 
between them and, therefore, the trial court's rulings in this regard must be sustained. 
As with other rulings, Heatsource has failed to properly challenge the trial court's 
ruling with respect to an express breach of contract claim. Heatsource makes no mention 
of an express contract between itself and BJC in either its Docketing Statement or in its 
Brief to this Court. As such, any potential challenge to this decision has been waived and 
the Court need not consider it.16 Indeed, since Heatsource never even alleged a cause of 
action for breach of an express contract, it should not now be allowed to assert it has such 
an express contract with BJC. 
B, Heatsource Has Not Appealed the Trial Court's Rejection of an 
Implied in Fact Contract Between Heatsource and BJC, and No Such 
Contract Existed. 
Similarly, the issue of whether an implied in fact contract existed between 
Heatsource and BJC is not before this Court in this appeal. Points II and IV of 
15
 To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC 
incorporates its briefing from below. (R. 1074-1080, 1416-1418). 
16
 See Brown, at Tj 23; Arviso, at f 4 n. 2. 
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Heatsource's Brief both state the argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
"Unjust Enrichment'" claim(s) of Heatsource. In those sections, however, Heatsource is 
clear that it is merely appealing and arguing issues related to the dismissal of 
Heatsource's implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) (the first branch of quantum 
meruit claims)—and not appealing the grant of summary judgment in BJC's favor on any 
purported implied in fact contract claim (the second branch of quantum meruit claims). 
This is shown by Heatsource's citation of the applicable legal elements of the claim(s) it 
is appealing: the sarnie standard for a contract implied in law (unjust enrichment) is set 
forth in both sections entitled Points II and IV (compare pp. 25 and 30 of Heatsource's 
Brief). Thus, both sections of Heatsource's Brief are directed at an alleged implied in 
law/unjust enrichment claim, rather than an implied in fact contract claim. 
In the trial court, the focus of Heatsource's Second Amended Complaint and the 
second motion for summary judgment was on whether an implied in fact contract existed 
directly between Heatsource and BJC. (R. 914-920, 1074-80, 1416-18). The trial court 
correctly found that Heatsource had not presented sufficient evidence to create a material 
dispute as to an implied in fact contract. (R. 1445). As an implied in fact contract has 
entirely distinct requirements from those discussed by Heatsource on this appeal related 
to implied in law/unjust enrichment claims, it must be determined that Heatsource has not 
appealed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment on any purported implied 
in fact contract. Heatsource's failure to raise such an argument and issue whatsoever in 
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Heatsource's Brief or its Docketing Statement, effectively waives any appeal of the trial 
i n 
court's dismissal of Heatsource's claims on an implied in fact contract. 
Even if the ruling had been appealed, it is entirely without merit because the trial 
court correctly found that such a claim was deficient. Specifically, BJC established 
through undisputed facts that no implied in fact contract existed between Heatsource and 
BJC directly because there was no meeting of the minds, the essential terms for a contract 
were lacking, and the parties never conducted themselves as if there was a direct contract 
between Heatsource and BJC. The parties' conduct demonstrated that there was no direct 
contract between Heatsource and BJC, and their actions are inconsistent with parties who 
believed that they had a direct contract. (R. 1078-1080). In its summary judgment 
briefing, BJC set forth 13 specific examples of conduct showing that BJC and Heatsource 
did not act like there was a contract directly between them and importantly, Heatsource 
did not even attempt to refute these examples. (Id.; 1418). Highlights of this evidence 
include the fact that the work performed by Heatsource was already part of its obligation 
under, and subject to, a series of contracts/subcontracts, Heatsource began working on the 
"U-bent" heaters prior to even meeting BJC representatives, Heatsource never directly 
asked BJC for payment, Heatsource invoiced DMP for its "additional" work, Heatsource 
never told DMP that it had a direct contract with BJC, and Heatsource participated in the 
request for equitable adjustment as a subcontractor of DMP. (R. 1078-79). The trial 
court astutely noted that Heatsource's participation in the request for equitable 
adjustment "is significant evidence that Heatsource never thought it had a contract." (R. 
17
 See Brown, at \ 23; Arviso, at \ 4 n. 2. 
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1447). This evidence shows that BJC and Heatsource never acted as if there was a 
separate contract between them and this conduct, combined with the lack of mutual 
assent and definite terms, substantiates the trial court's determination that no implied in 
fact contract existed. (R. 1445-47).18 
The end result of the failure to appeal the granting of summary judgment on the 
implied in fact contract claim, as well as the trial court's correct ruling in this regard, is 
that Heatsource cannot establish a contractual relationship with BJC into which an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be imposed. Without an underlying 
contract directly between Heatsource and BJC, there can be no implied covenant between 
the parties. Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to BJC on 
the implied covenant claim. 
C, Even if a Contract Existed and a Covenant was Imposed, BJC has Not 
Breached any such Covenant 
The analysis of the Court can end with the recognition that no contractual 
relationship existed between Heatsource and BJC into which an implied covenant can be 
imposed. However, even if there were a contract between BJC and Heatsource such that 
a covenant inhered between them, BJC demonstrated to the lower court that it had not 
breached any such covenant as a matter of law. Under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, each party promises not to "' intentionally or purposely do anything which will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of a contract.'" Malibu Inv. 
Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, t 19, 996 P.2d 1043 (quoting St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 
18
 To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC 
incorporates its arguments from the briefing below. (R. 1074-1080, 1416-1418). 
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199). Significantly, however, a party cannot be found liable for breaching the implied 
covenant when it acts in conformity with the underlying express contract. Five F, LLC v. 
Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373, ^ 23, 81 P.3d 105. In other words, if the 
purportedly breaching conduct is permitted by law or by the underlying express contract, 
then there can be no valid breach of an implied covenant. Id. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that BJC acted properly. The most critical fact 
here is that BJC's Spec, for the heat probe system never changed during the entire 
process. (R. 336, 1068). As such, BJC simply expected full performance under its 
contract with DMP: that is, the production of a complete heat probe system that met the 
specifications. (R. 333-34, 337, 1066-67, 1069). Moreover, prior to the request for 
equitable adjustment, Heatsource never said that it would require extra compensation, 
that its work would cost more, or that it would bill on a time and materials basis for its 
work. (R. 336-37, 1068-69). Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that BJC paid 
$716,798 to DMP on the Contract, from which DMP then paid its subcontractors, 
including Heatsource. (R. 337, 1069). Such payment demonstrates good faith. In 
addition, when Heatsource and DCS, through DMP, sought an equitable adjustment to 
the contract price, the evidence below showed that BJC properly, and in good faith, 
considered the request, and that DMP believes BJC acted properly. (R. 338, 1079-70). 
Under these facts, it is clear that BJC acted in good faith, did nothing to prevent 
Heatsource from gaining the benefits under its contract with DCS, and did not breach any 
purportedly implied covenant. Based on this evidence, the trial court correctly found that 
Heatsource "has not identified any actions on the part of BJC that could even potentially 
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violate an implied covenant.... Indeed, the undisputed facts which have not been 
controverted by Heatsource show that BJC has not acted in bad faith with respect to any 
potential implied covenant claim." (R. 911). Summary judgment was therefore properly 
granted below. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted entirely within its discretion and ruled correctly in every 
regard while granting summary judgment in favor of BJC and against Heatsource. On 
this appeal, Heatsource has entirely failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the trial 
court that would merit reversal of the orders at issue. Furthermore, the undisputed facts 
supported the trial court's decisions to grant summary judgment to BJC on all of 
Heatsource's claims. Simply put, Heatsource has not raised one argument or fact that 
demonstrates any error on the part of the trial court. Consequently, BJC respectfully 
requests that this Court uphold the rulings of the trial court and reject the present appeal 
of Heatsource. 
Dated: April 4, 2008 Holland & Hart LLP 
BYym K. Benard 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Bechtel Jacobs Company 
44 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC was sent via U.S. First Class 
mail, postage prepaid this 4th day of April, 2008, to the following: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Garrett & Garrett 
2091 East 1300, #201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
(801)581-1144 
Attorney for Appellant E&M Sales West, Inc., 
dba Heatsource 
Kevin D. Swenson 
Dunn & Dunn 
505 East 200 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801)521-6677 
Attorney for Diversified Metal 
Products, Inc. 
I 
45 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum A: Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment of Bechtel Jacobs 
Company, entered on December 7, 2005 by the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder (the "2005 Order") 
Addendum B: Ruling and Order granting second motion for summary judgment of 
Bechtel Jacobs Company, entered on November 29, 2006 by the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder (the "2006 Order") 
3844980 3 DOC 
46 
Tab A 
Brent Johnson, 7558 
Bryan K. Benard, 9023 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
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c. 
^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E & M SALES WEST INC., dba 
HEATSOURCE, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, and 
DIVERSIFIED CONTROL SYSTEMS, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY 
Civil Action No. 020901874 
Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS 
The motion for summary judgment by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Bechtel 
Jacobs Company LLC ("BJC") came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder on the 21st day of November, 2005, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff E & M Sales West Inc. dba 
Heatsource ("Heatsource") appeared through its counsel of record, Edward M. Garrett of Garrett 
& Garrett. Defendant and Third-party Defendants Diversified Metal Products ("DMP") and 
Diversified Control Systems ("DCS") appeared through their counsel of record, Kevin D. 
Swenson of Suitter Axland. BJC specially appeared by its counsel of record, Bryan K. Benard of 
Holland & Hart LLP. 
The Court having read and considered the moving papers and evidence in support of 
BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the opposing papers, evidence and affidavit of 
Heatsource, and the reply memoranda and evidence submitted by BJC, and furthermore, having 
conducted oral argument related to the same, and being now fully advised, 
HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS: 
1. Based on Heatsource's failure to comply with the requirements of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 7, as well as Heatsource's failure to controvert the evidence submitted by 
BJC to support its undisputed material facts, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and accepts as undisputed, the material facts set forth by BJC in its moving papers. 
2. BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with respect to Heatsource's first 
and third causes of action in the Amended Complaint for Quantum Meruit and Unjust 
Enrichment respectively. The Court finds that these claims are identical and are equitable in 
nature, such that they may only be brought in the absence of an express contract over the subject 
matter of the underlying work performed. The Court finds that the undisputed facts demonstrate 
1 
that BJC contracted with DMP for the production of a probe system, a part of which included the 
creation of certain five-zone heaters. DMP then subcontracted the production of the five-zone 
heaters to DCS. In turn, DCS then subcontracted the specific production of the five-zone heaters 
to Heatsource. Consequently, the Court finds that the work performed by Heatsource related to 
the production of the five-zone heaters was subject to, and within the scope of, the express 
contracts and subcontracts involved. Since the production of the five-zone heater forms the basis 
of Heatsource's first and third causes of action for Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment, but 
also is entirely covered by, and within the scope of, the express contracts and subcontracts 
between BJC, DMP, DCS and Heatsource, as a matter of law, Heatsource's first and third causes 
of action fail. Heatsource's first and third causes of action are therefore dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Heatsource's fourth cause 
of action in the Amended Complaint for fraud. The Court finds that the undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Heatsource cannot establish the requisite elements of a claim for fraud. 
Specifically, the Court finds that the undisputed facts show that Heatsource cannot demonstrate 
that any BJC representative made a false statement or misrepresentation concerning a presently 
existing fact or that any BJC representative knew such statement or representation was false. In 
addition, the Court finds that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Heatsource cannot show the 
required detrimental reliance on any purported statement or representation made by a BJC 
representative. Accordingly, since Heatsource cannot establish the requisite elements of a fraud 
claim, and has not created a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise controverted the evidence 
2 
& in 
submitted by BJC as undisputed, BJC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Heatsource's fourth cause of action is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
4. BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Heatsource's second cause 
of action in the Amended Complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. The Court finds that the pleadings before the Court as well as the undisputed facts 
presented by BJC, establish that Heatsource has not pled, and does not have, a direct contract, 
either express or implied with BJC. Consequently, since no direct contract has been properly 
alleged between BJC and Heatsource, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
present between Heatsource and BJC. Moreover, Heatsource has not identified any actions on 
the part of BJC that could even potentially violate an implied covenant, even if one existed 
between the parties. Indeed, the undisputed facts which have not been controverted by 
Heatsource show that BJC has not acted in bad faith with respect to any potential implied 
covenant claim. Consequently, BJC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the second 
cause of action. Heatsource's second cause of action is therefore dismissed without prejudice, as 
a limited opportunity exists for Heatsource to perhaps plead a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant as discussed below. 
5. The Court grants limited leave to Heatsource to file a Second Amended 
Complaint to assert a direct contract implied in fact claim against BJC. The Court further grants 
leave to Heatsource to plead an implied covenant claim related to such implied in fact contract 
claim, if the covenant claim asserts a breach of the covenant beyond alleged nonpayment under 
the purported implied in fact contract and that is directly related to the alleged express promises 
made. The Court does not grant leave to allege any other claims. Heatsource is to file the 
^ 11 
Second Amended Complaint within 20 days from the hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was held on November 21, 2005. 
Dated: 7\ 
>* 
_,2005. BYT, 
6rt K. H i lde r^^ t t 
District Court Judge 
^£*<uv h V/ 
Approved as to form: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Garrett & Garrett 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/9 / 
TabB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J^Juc^o.a/Disfrfcf 
E & M SALES WEST INC., dba 
HEATSOURCE, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, and 
DIVERSIFIED CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Third Party Defendants 
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS 
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^ L T U K £ UOUNTY 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 020901874 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendant Bechtel Jacobs' ( UBJC") second Motion for Summary Judgment 
was argued to the Court on November 27, 2006. Edward M. Garrett appeared 
for plaintiff, Bryan K. Benard and Jennifer L. Lange appeared for BJC, 
and Kevin Swenson, counsel for the Diversified parties, was also present, 
but did not argue. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
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I. Issue for Decision 
Whether plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed, 
as a matter of law 
II. History of Proceedings 
This matter has been pending before the Court for about four years, 
and has had a fairly convoluted history Confining this discussion to 
the controversy between plaintiff (vvHeatsource") and BJC, the following 
history is important to an understanding of the Court's Ruling at this 
time 
The case arises from a series of contracts and subcontracts, 
originating m BJCs agreement with the federal government to complete 
an environmental cleanup project m Tennessee BJC contracted with 
Diversified Metal Products, which m turn contracted with Diversified 
Control Systems, the general subject matter of which contracts was 
production of a heater probe system Diversified Control Systems (UDCS") 
m turn entered into a contract with Heatsource, memorialized by a 
purchase order, for production of a five-zone heater that would be a part 
of the heater probe system 
After discovery m this matter, BJC's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard by the Court on November 21, 2005, and m an Order 
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entered December 8, 2005, the Court dismissed Counts 1 and 3 (quantum 
meruit and unjust enrichment) , along with a fraud claim, which is not at 
issue m any way m the present Motion In addition to dismissing the 
unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims (which BJC argued and the Court 
agreed amounted to the same claim) , m an abundance of caution this Court 
gave plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which Complaint 
was specifically limited to any claim for contract implied m fact, and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
I suggest that the Order allowing amendment was an abundance of 
caution, because BJC had argued persuasively that plaintiff may not 
assert equitable claims under the general rubric of unjust 
enrichment/quantum meruit, if the subject matter of the claim is covered 
by a contract or set of contracts As part of this Court's ruling of 
December 8, 2005, I found that contracts did, m fact, exist covering the 
subject matter of plaintiff's claims against BJC. 
Nevertheless, I allowed the amendment m the event plaintiff could 
show that BJC had, through its conduct, entered into a separate and 
distinct contract with plaintiff for additional or separate work related 
to production of the heater. 
As a necessary part of my earlier ruling, I accepted BJC's position 
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that plaintiff had utterly failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as plaintiff did not specifically 
identify and restate BJC's statement of undisputed facts, and even where 
plaintiff claimed factual disputes, m virtually every instance those 
statements were not supported by citations to the record In addition, 
plaintiff relied heavily on an Affidavit of Andrew Nelson BJC properly 
asked the Court to disregard that Affidavit, because it came subsequent 
to Mr Nelson's voluminous deposition, and it was inconsistent with or 
contradicted deposition testimony I am not sure that I expressly ruled 
that the Affidavit should be stricken, but it was inherent in my prior 
ruling that plaintiff had failed to adequately rebut at least the first 
28 claimed undisputed facts asserted by BJC and at this time I make clear 
that the Nelson Aifidavit submitted in 2005 should be stricken 
III. Discussion 
The gravamen of plaintiff's present claim is that BJC requested work 
from Heatsource trat was more than originally contemplated, and that the 
work Heatsource did, and for which it was apparently compensated, was 
defective, if at all, because BJC changed the specifications, 
specifically, BJC required a tolerance to 800° Celsius, rather than 650° 
Celsius, which was indisputably a number provided by DCS verbally to 
/ / f / l - ^ 
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Heatsource 
The critical issue for the Court at this time is whether plaintiff 
has identified any admissible evidence that would controvert BJC's 
position that a contract implied in fact was never created by the conduct 
of these two parties A significant portion of the argument on November 
27, 2006, was spent distinguishing contract implied m law from contract 
implied m fact As the fairly plentiful case law on the topic makes 
clear, this is a distinction which is not always analyzed as precisely 
as it should be See, Davies v. Olson, 746 P 2d 264, (Utah App 1987) 
In fact, plaintiff's claims I and III m its prior version of the 
Complaint essentially alleged contract implied m law under the two names 
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit They were, accordingly, 
duplicative, but they were dismissed primarily because the Court found 
that a contract (indeed, a network of contracts) existed and recourse to 
a contract implied in law, which is not really a contract at all, but 
merely an equitable means to prevent unjust enrichment 
Contract implied m fact is clearly a different creature from 
contract implied m law As the Utah Court of Appeals noted m Davies, 
contracts implied m fact are "no different than express contracts, 
although different m mode of expressing assent " Id at 269 (citing, 
i/i/i/i 
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A Corbm, Corbm on Contracts § 18 (1963)) The elements of a contract 
implied m fact are (1) the defendant requested the plaintiff to perform 
work, (2) the plamtiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her 
for those services, and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that 
the plaintiff expected compensation See, Id , and P A D D v Graystone 
Pines Homeowneis, 789 P 2d 52, 57 (Utah App 1990) 
Based on the foregoing faced with BJC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to presert evidence of each of 
the foregoing elements I must conclude that plaintiff has not done so 
First, plaintiff is fairly limited m its options, having already 
admitted, by failure to properly controvert, numerous facts that go to 
the heart of the issue Even if, however, plaintiff had properly 
controverted the 1 acts previously alleged by BJC, plaintiff identifies 
a very sparse factual landscape to support its claim That is, 
plaintiff's own facts, including deposition testimony that I have 
reviewed again (Andrew Nelson), makes it clear that Heatsource started 
working on an alternative heater m May and June of 2001, before they had 
even met directly with BJC and certainly before even Heatsource claims 
that any promises were made 
The critical meeting at which BJC claims words and conduct evinced 
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a contract implied m fact occurred on June 27, 2001, m Idaho 
Plaintiff's best case argument is that it had representatives present at 
a meeting, which was also attended by BJC and the two Diversified 
entities A significant topic was the failure of the heater to function 
at a required temperature Plaintiff claims that statements by BJC 
representatives, including something to the effect that if a product is 
produced and functioned as required, BJC would back up the money truck 
While BJC denies that the comment was ever made, that denial would merely 
set up a dispute, but not one that is material to my determination of any 
issue before the court 
To summarize, based on already admitted facts, the work performed 
by Heatsource was part of its obligations under its subcontract with DCS 
Heatsource admitted that the work it was required to do under its 
subcontract with DCS equally describes work for uU-bent" heaters and non 
U-bent heaters, which is one of the distinctions now being urged 
Heatsource never claimed that it was billing on a time and material basis 
until it submitted a request for equitable adjustment, which was not done 
until weeks after the work was done In other words, Heatsource has 
essentially admitted that there was no discussion of time and materials 
payment on June 27, 2001, and its admission of a request for equitable 
\U(1( 
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adjustment does not argue for a contract implied m fact. On the 
contrary, it is significant evidence that Heatsource never thought it had 
a contract and was merely seeking an additional payment to which it was 
not otherwise entLtled To the extent Heatsource is claiming a defective 
or deficient temperature specification, that is a claim that must be 
addressed, if at all, within the express contractual framework United 
States v. Spearir, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed 166, 1918 U S 
LEXIS 1700 (1918). 
After carefully reconsidering all of the applicable case law, I am 
persuaded that both contract implied m law and contract implied m fact 
theories are baried if enforceable contracts exist covering the same 
subject matter. (See cases cited m BJC's openmg memorandum, which 
cases address both branches of quasi contract. P.A.D.D. 789 P 2d 52, is 
an example addressing contract implied in fact). Accordingly, for this 
reason alone BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. In 
addition, even if a contract implied m fact may be considered m a 
circumstance where a contract or set of contracts exists; for example, 
if the subject matter of the contract implied m fact is sufficiently 
separate from the work at issue m the enforceable contracts, I find no 
evidence creating a genuine and material dispute that such was the case 
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in the present matter 
Referring specifically to the elements of a contract implied m 
fact I do not find any evidence that the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to perform the work It is reasonable to determine from the 
evidence that, at some point, Heatsource desired BJC to compensate for 
the work that it considered to be additional, but the evidence does not 
support that Heatsource had any such expectation at the time of its sole 
conversation with BJC (June 27, 2001) and the evidence does not support 
that the final element existed, namely, that BJC knew or should have 
known that Heatsource expected compensation The only evidence 
appropriately m the record supports BJC's position that it expected 
performance from Heatsource and all other contractors and subcontractors 
under its fixed price contract 
For the foregoing reasons, BJCs Motion for Summary Judgment be and 
hereby is granted, and plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint against BJC 
is dismissed No further Order is required 
Dated this-^/"~ day of November, 2006 
E & M SALES WEST V. 
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY PAGE 10 RULING AND ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this ^i day of November, 
2006 : 
Edward M Garrett 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Brent Johnson 
Bryan K. Benard 
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Attorneys for Defendant Bechtel Jacobs 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
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